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Abstract: A typical first stab at explicating the thesis of physicalism is this: phys-
icalism is true iff every fact about the world is entailed by the conjunction of
physical facts. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for other hypotheses about the
fundamental nature of our world. But it has been recognized that this would leave
such hypothese without the fighting chance that they deserve: certain negative
truths, like the truth (if it is one) that there are no angels, are not entailed by
the physical facts, but nonetheless do not threaten physicalism. A plausible rem-
edy that has been suggested by Jackson and Chalmers is that physicalism boils
down to the thesis that every truth is entailed by the conjunction of the physical
facts prefixed by a “that’s it” or “totality” operator. To evaluate this suggestion,
we need to know what that operator means, and—since the truth of physicalism
hinges on what is entailed by a totality claim—what its logic is. That is, we need
to understand the logic of totality, or total logic. In this paper, I add a totality
operator to the language of propositional logic, and present a model theory for it,
building on a suggestion by Chalmers and Jackson. I then prove determination
results for a number of different systems.
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1 Entry by entailment and negative truths
In inquiry, we want to find the truth about the world. But we may also want
to know, for a given truth, whether it is comprehensive: whether it gives a full
account of the world, as it were. To take an example that has figured prominently
in philosophical debates: given a complete physical description of the world, it is
natural to wonder whether it leaves out something, or whether every truth about
the world is, in some sense, already contained in it. Physicalism is committed to
rule out the first alternative. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for alternative
hypotheses about the world, such as the idealist view that some mental description
of a world is comprehensive, or the dualist view that while some physical-cum-
mental description is comprehensive, no purely physical or purely mental one is.
What, in more precise terms, is it for a truth to be comprehensive? According
to one influential approach, it is a matter of entailing all truths. Frank C. Jackson
observed that a defender of a serious metaphysical view faces a “placement prob-
lem” or “location problem”: to show that every feature of our world “[has] a place
in the account some serious metaphysics tells of what our world is like” (Jackson
(1998, p. 5); see also Jackson (1994)). On his view—the so-called “entry by entail-
ment” doctrine—a feature has such a place “if the feature is entailed by the account
told in the terms favoured by the metaphysics in question” (Jackson (1998, p.5)).
Similarly, Jackson’s joint paper with David J. Chalmers (Chalmers and Jackson
(2001)) as well as Chalmers (2012) are concerned with identifying truths A such
that for every truth B, the material conditional A → B is a priori—a relation
closely akin to entailment.
This idea faces a simple problem: typical candidates for comprehensive truths
do not entail certain negative truths. So, for example, the conjunction of all phys-
ical truths does not entail the truth—assuming it is one—that there are no angels.
Presumably, there is an angel-ridden possible world that is physically exactly like
ours. In response, Jackson and Chalmers modify their account of what it takes for
a truth A to be comprehensive. It is not necessary that A by itself entails every
truth. Rather, A together with a statement to the effect that A is a total truth—in
a sense to be specified—needs to entail every truth. To return to the troublesome
example: the complete physical truth about the world, together with the truth
that that truth is total, entails that there are no angels. In an angel-ridden world,
no physical truth is total, after all. (Jackson (1994), Jackson (1998))
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The added conjunct has various names in the literature: “totality statement”,
“that’s all clause”, or “stop clause”. We can take such a statement or clause to be
the result of applying an operator to another sentence. The operator—to be called
a “totality operator”—may be pronounced “and that’s it”. Applied to a sentence
A, it yields another sentence, “A, and that’s it”. I shall use the symbol T for it.
To make scope distinctions more perspicuous, I shall prefix rather than suffix it to
the sentence it operates on.1
An account of the semantics of such a totality operator is implicit in the joint
paper Chalmers and Jackson (2001). Chalmers then invoked a totality operator in
his most recent presentation of the zombie argument against physicalism (Chalmers
(2010)), and in his Chalmers (2012).2 Due to the influence of these works, the
totality operator has become reasonably familiar to many philosophers. Still, its
logic and semantics—the consequences of the account implicit in Chalmers and
Jackson (2001)—have hardly received any discussion. This paper aims to remedy
this, and provide us with a fuller understanding of the workings of this operator.
The formal tools used are taken from modal logic. Since the study of the logic
of modality is called “modal logic”, I shall call the study of the logic of totality
“total logic”.
I start by taking a closer look at the Chalmers-Jackson account of the semantics
of T (section 2). Next, I introduce formal “totality models” (section 3). The class
of all totality models is shown to determine a simple base system of total logic,
called ‘C’ (section 4). Finally, I discuss extensions of the base system (sections 5
and 6).
2 The metaphysics of outstripping
As mentioned above, a sketch for a semantics of the totality operator is offered in
Chalmers and Jackson (2001). They specify the truth-conditions of the operator
in terms of the notion of a world’s being minimal in a certain class of worlds, and
1My regimentation of “that’s-it” talk with an operator does not commit me to the claim that
there is such an operator in English, nor to the claim that if there is such an operator, it is
conceptually primitive, rather than understood in terms of some “totality predicate”. Thanks to
Kevin Mulligan for discussion on this point.
2Totality facts—as opposed to totality statements and totality operators—had been discussed
already in Armstrong (1989).
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define minimality, in turn, in terms of a relation of outstripping. They use ‘P ’ to
denote a complete physical description of the world, and formulate their solution
to the problem of negative truths as follows:
This loophole can be closed by conjoining to P a “that’s-all” statement
T , asserting that our world is a minimal world satisfying P . Intuitively,
this statement says that our world contains what is implied by P , and
only what is implied by P . . . . [A] minimal P -world is a P -world that
outstrips no other P -world. It is plausible that no world containing
angels is a minimal P -world: for any P -world containing angels, there
is an angel-free P -world that it outstrips. So P&T implies that there
are no angels. (Chalmers and Jackson (2001, p. 317))
While an account of a totality operator is implicit, Chalmers and Jackson are
explicitly concerned with a separate statement T , read as “that’s all”. The word
“that” anaphorically refers to P , so that the logical form of T is more perspicuously
represented by writing T (P ). In their semantics, T (P ) entails P . For that reason,
the first conjunct in P&T (P ) is redundant. I shall thus write T (P ) or simply TP
instead of P&T .
The Chalmers-Jackson theory explains the totality operator in terms of possible
worlds, and a certain relation of outstripping. If we wish to study the logic of
totality, we do not need to know the nature of this relation of outstripping, as
opposed to its formal properties. The situation is analogous to the one in modal
logic: when doing logic, we can be unconcerned about what kind of entities possible
worlds are, and what it is for one world to be accessible from another. We can treat
possible worlds just as any members of some set, and only need assumptions about
the formal features of the accessibility relation. Still, as philosophers, we may wish
to know something about the metaphysics of possible worlds, accessibility, and
in our case outstripping. Moreover, we will not be able to ignore metaphysical
questions if we wish to determine what the right logic of totality is.
Chalmers and Jackson give an account of outstripping in terms of parthood
and duplication:
More formally, we can say that world w1 outstrips world w2 if w1 con-
tains a qualitative duplicate of w2 as a proper part and the reverse is
not the case. (Chalmers and Jackson (2001, p. 317))
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For future reference, I shall call the biconditional that follows from this definition
“CJ-Outstripping”.3
CJ-Outstripping w outstrips w′ iff some proper part of w duplicates w′, but no
proper part of w′ duplicates w.
For our study of the logic of totality, it will be important what formal features the
relation of outstripping has. It is immediate from the formulation of the account
that outstripping is asymmetric. Furthermore, we can appeal to the following
principle to show that outstripping is transitive.
DupDec If x and x′ are duplicates and y is a proper part of x, then there is a
proper part y′ of x′ that is a duplicate of y.
DupDec captures the plausible thought that two things with non-matching decom-
positions into parts are not duplicates. For example, none of my duplicates will be
an extended mereological simple if I myself have proper parts.
To show that DupDec entails the transitivity of outstripping, suppose that w
outstrips w′, and w′ outstrips w′′. Then there is a proper part v of w that duplicates
w′, and a proper part v′ of w′ that duplicates w′′. Then DupDec guarantees that
v has a proper part t that duplicates v′. Since proper parthood is transitive, t
is a proper part of w. Since duplication is transitive, t duplicates w′′. So some
proper part of w duplicates w′′. Suppose now, for reductio, that a proper part
v′′ of w′′ duplicates w. Then by DupDec, it follows that v′′ has a proper part t′′
that duplicates v. Since duplication is transitive, t′′ duplicates w′. Since proper
parthood is transitive, t′′ is a proper part of w′′. Hence some proper part of w′′ is
a duplicate of w′, and w′ does not outstrip w′′, contrary to our assumption.
So outstripping is asymmetric and transitive, and is thus a partial order. One
might think that the clause “but no proper part of w′ duplicates w” is redundant,
and that the statement of the mereological account could thus be simplified. In-
deed, in his most recent presentation of this account, Chalmers drops that clause,
and appears to suggest that he is still defining a partial order: “[W]e have a partial
ordering among worlds. We might say that world w1 outstrips another world w2 if
3I have changed “qualitative duplicate” to “duplicate” (as has, incidentally, Chalmers in his
formulation in Chalmers (2012, p. 151)). On some accounts, a qualitative duplicate is a dupli-
cate simpliciter. But for the purposes of the logic of totality, I wish to remain neutral on this
metaphysical issue.
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w1 includes a duplicate of w2 as a proper part” (Chalmers (2012, p. 151)). Call the
relation thus defined outstripping*. It turns out that given DupDec, outstripping*
is co-extensional with outstripping if and only if the following principle holds:
DupPart No world duplicates any of its proper parts.4
Moreover, outstripping* is not a partial order, if DupPart is false.5
However, DupPart is arguably false. Consider a world of one-way infinite re-
currence. The world minus the first epoch is a proper part of the whole world.
Arguably, though, that proper part is a duplicate of the whole world.
So much for the formal features that outstripping has, on the Chalmers-Jackson
account. It remains to clarify what the pertinent notion of parthood is. On one
popular conception, parts are spatiotemporal parts—a part occupies a subregion
of the region occupied by the whole. But on this conception, CJ-Outstripping
does not give the desired result in the case of the angels. Suppose that angels are
non-physical, but still in spacetime. Then a physical duplicate of the actual world
in which there are angels may have no proper part that is a duplicate simpliciter
of the actual world. For proper parts of the world would involve proper parts of
its spacetime, and those may fail to be duplicates of the actual world. So the
account needs objects to have non-spatiotemporal parts. Arguably, a one-proton
world outstrips a one-neutron world. Simplifying the physics a bit: the proton
has charge and the neutron has not, while they agree on all other fundamental
properties. Hence a proton needs to have a proper part that duplicates a neutron,
for example—namely the part we get after subtracting electric charge. Depending
on the conception of properties adopted, that part may be itself a property, or it
may be a bearer of a property.
This concludes my sketch of the metaphysical background to the logical issues
to be discussed in the rest of the paper. I will have occasion to return to the
4To verify that the co-extensionality of these relations entails DupPart, suppose that the latter
is false. Then some w duplicates its own proper part v. It follows that w outstrips* itself, but
does not outstrip itself. For the converse entailment, suppose now that w outstrips* but does
not outstrip w′. Then some proper part v of w duplicates w′. But also, some proper part v′ of
w′ duplicates w. By DupDec, v has a proper part t that duplicates v′. But because both proper
parthood and duplication are transitive, t is a proper part of w and duplicates w. So DupPart
fails.
5If DupPart is false, some world outstrips* itself, and so outstripping* is not a strict partial
order. But it is not a weak partial order either, since it is not reflexive.
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Chalmers-Jackson account of outstripping briefly in the next section, and again in
section 6.
3 Totality models
According to the modified entry by entailment account, we need to ask whether
T (A) entails every truth in order to evaluate whether some truth A is compre-
hensive. Logic—on at least one important conception—studies the relation of
entailment. This gives us a reason to be interested in the logic of T .
A full account of the logic of T would include its interaction with various other
operators—modal and epistemic ones, for example—and with quantifiers, includ-
ing, presumably, propositional quantifiers. In this paper, I shall only treat a very
small fragment of the logic of T : its interaction with the connectives of propo-
sitional logic, and its behaviour under iteration. I hope that this will provide a
sound basis for further and more complex investigations.
Accordingly, I shall here work with a simple formal language, which I call LT .
Basically, LT is the language of propositional modal logic, except that it has a
totality operator T instead of the necessity operator . The sentences of LT can
be specified by the usual formation rules: (i) all atomic sentences p0, p1, . . . and
⊥ are LT -sentences; (ii) if A and B are LT -sentences, so are ¬A, A ∧ B, A ∨ B,
A→ B, A↔ B, and TA; and (iii) nothing not formed in accordance with (i) and
(ii) is an LT -sentence.
One limitation of the language LT deserves discussion: it does not allow the
formation of sentences that are infinitely long. In the present context, this may
appear to be a serious shortcoming. For candidate sentences to which T may poten-
tially be truly applied are typically infinitary. For all we know, a complete physical
description of the world must specify the value of certain fields at continuum-many
spacetime-points. This may prompt the worry that the relevant logical structure
of philosophical arguments involving totality-operators cannot be captured in LT .
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However, it is unclear whether the validity of those arguments in any way
turns on logical issues related to infinity. Nothing stops us from taking a complete
physical description of the world as the interpretation of an atomic sentence of LT .
Infinity can thus be “hidden away” in a syntactically simple item. Still, it would be
6Thanks to Graham Priest for raising this worry.
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an interesting project to explore a language in which T applies to a set of sentences
(of arbitrary cardinality) and forms a sentence. That project is beyond the scope
of the present paper, however.
I shall now specify a model theory for this language. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
the models to be used in interpreting LT involve possible worlds and a relation
of outstripping. As in modal logic, it will be convenient to distinguish between
frames, which abstract from the interpretation of atomic sentences, and models,
which do take that interpretation into account.
A totality frame F is a pair 〈W,<〉, where W is a set and < a binary relation
on W . A totality model M is a triple 〈W,<, I〉, where 〈W,<〉 is a totality frame
and I an assignment, taken to be a function that assigns a subset of W to every
non-negative integer.
Next, we define what it is for a sentence A of LT to be true at a world w in a
model M—in symbols, Mw A. Atomic sentences are indexed by the non-negative
integers, and pj is true in a world in a model iff that world belongs to the image of
j under I: I: Mw pj iff w ∈ I(j). For sentences with the connectives ¬,∧,∨,→,↔,
the clauses are those familiar from propositional logic. The interesting evaluation
clause is the one for T . Following Chalmers and Jackson, we specify it as follows:
Definition 1. Mw TA iff Mw A and for all w′ such that w′ < w, 6Mw′ A.
So TA is true at w iff w is a minimal one among the worlds where A is true.
Using the Chalmers-Jackson account of outstripping, the condition that if TA is
true in w, A is not true in any w′ outstripped by w can be heuristically motivated as
follows: if A is true in such a w′, then A does not describe more than a proper part
of w—the one that is a duplicate of w′.7 Let v be such a part. As a consequence of a
relatively uncontroversial mereological principle—called “Weak Supplementation”
or sometimes just “Supplementation” in the literature—there is a part u of w that
does not overlap v.8 But then, it seems, A fails to describe u. Hence “A, and that’s
it” is intuitively false.
Suppose that A correctly describes a proper part of the world, but not the
whole world—A is true and TA false. Then, given a certain interpreted language,
7Since more than one A-world may be outstripped by w, and since w may have duplicate
proper parts, there is not, in general, a unique proper part of w that duplicates an A-world
outstripped by w.
8For mereological notions, see Varzi (2012), for example.
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there is no guarantee that the rest of the world can be described as well. Indeed,
no truth logically stronger than A may be expressible. So there is no guarantee
that TB is true for any sentence B in the language. For example, all the atomic
sentences might be interpreted to mean that there is strictly more than 1g of mass
in the universe. Then no world with massive objects is going to be exhaustively
described by any truth in that language. Switching back to talk of models instead
of interpreted languages, I shall call a world w inexhaustible in a model M iff
6Mw TA for all A ∈ LT . This concept will be useful in later sections.
We are now in a position to define validity of sentences of LT relative to our
model theory. The definitions are standard ones: A is valid in a modelM = 〈W,<
, I〉 iff it is true in every w ∈ W ; it is valid in a frame iff it is valid in all models on
that frame; it is valid in a class of frames (models) iff it is valid in every member
of that class.
Occasionally, I shall call the model theory just described a “semantics”, even
though this might be misleading. For it does not, by any standard, specify the
meaning of the operator T . The intended meaning is “and that’s it”, but the model
theory allows for many other interpretations, besides the totality interpretation.
For example, we might give T a primacy interpretation: ‘TA’ means that A is
true for the first time. On that interpretation, the symbol < should be thought of
as standing for the earlier-than relation. Conversely, we might give T an ultimacy
interpretation: ‘TA’ means that A is true for the last time. We may note that
on the primacy and the ultimacy interpretation, the operator T is definable in the
language of tense logic. ‘For the first time, A’ is true at an instant just in case
both A and H¬A, meaning “it has always been the case that ¬A”, are true. ‘For
the last time, A’ is true at an instant just in case both A and G¬A, meaning “it
will always be the case that ¬A”, are true.
Suppose that we used the relation of outstripping to define an operator O as
follows:
Definition 2. Mw OA iff for all w′ such that w′ < w, Mw′ A.
Then we could, in analogy to the tense-logical case, define TA by A ∧O¬A.
Given the Chalmers-Jackson account of outstripping, OA means that A is true
in all worlds that duplicate a proper part of ours, but do not have a proper part
that is duplicated by our world. We may note that the evaluation clause of O is
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the same as the one for  in standard modal logic, except that the role of the
accessibility relation R is played by the converse of <.
Together with the decidability of the set of sentences valid in all Kripke models—
a basic result in modal logic (see Lemmon and Scott (1977, p. 44) or any other
textbook)—the definability of T in terms of O entails that the set of sentences valid
in all totality models is also decidable. For we can easily translate any A ∈ LT into
an A′ ∈ L such that A is valid in all totality models iff A′ is valid in all Kripke
frames, and then apply a decision procedure to A′.
Moreover, it follows from these observations about temporal interpretations of
LT that the basic logic of “and that’s it” is the same as the basic logic of “for the
first time” and of “for the last time”. By “basic logic”, I here mean the logic we get
without imposing constraints on the admissible frames, and without considering
the relationship of T to other operators.
4 The base system of total logic
After giving the model theory, I shall now specify a formal system. The aim is
to axiomatize the class of LT -sentences that are valid in all totality models, or
equivalently, valid in all totality frames.
We have seen that the operator T can be defined in terms of O. If it were also
possible to define O in terms of T , then the task of axiomatization would be easy.
I have remarked that the evaluation clause for O in totality models is the same as
the evaluation clause for  in the standard Kripke semantics (modulo relabelling).
Sound and complete axiomatizations of relative to Kripke models are well-known.
If OA were definable in LT , we would obtain a sound and complete axiomatiztion of
the class of LT -sentences valid in all totality models simply by substituting an LT -
definiens for OA in the system K, which is a sound and complete axiomatization
of the logic of O.
However, O cannot be defined in terms of T , as I shall now prove. It is a
straightforward consequence of Definition 1 that if w < w, then ¬TA is true in w
for every A. Likewise ¬TA is true for all A in worlds that have an infinite chain of
worlds satisfying a certain condition below them. To make this precise, say that
W ′ ⊆ W is a chain in M iff W ′ is totally ordered by <. Say that a chain W ′ is
unending if for every w ∈ W ′ there is w′ ∈ W ′ such that w′ < w; and that W ′ is
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homogeneous if (i) for all w,w′ ∈ W ′, j ∈ N, w ∈ I(j) iff w′ ∈ I(j), and (ii) for all
w,w′ ∈ W ′ and w′′ ∈ W \W ′, w < w′′ iff w′ < w′′, and w′′ < w iff w′′ < w′.
Lemma 1. If W ′ is a homogeneous unending chain in M, then for all w,w′ ∈ W ′
and all A, Mw A iff Mw′ A.
Proof. By induction on the length of formulas. The key step concerns A = TB.
If Mw TB, then Mw B, and Mw′ B by the induction hypothesis. Moreover, 6Mv B
for all v < w. Since w is part of an unending chain, there is such a v ∈ W ′. Pick
v′ ∈ W ′ with v′ < w′. By the induction hypothesis applied to v and v′, 6Mv′ B. So
Mw′ TB. If 6Mw TB, similar reasoning establishes that 6Mw′ TB. 
Lemma 2. If W ′ is a homogeneous unending chain in M, and w ∈ W ′, then
Mw ¬TA.
Proof. If 6Mw A, then Mw ¬TA by Definition 1. So suppose Mw A. Since w ∈ W ′
and W ′ is unending, there is w′ ∈ W ′ such that w′ < w. Since W ′ is homogeneous,
Mw′ A by Lemma 1. Hence Mw′ ¬TA. 
To prove the indefinability of O in LT , I shall construct two models with iden-
tical homogeneous unending chain. In one of the models, there is a further world
outstripped by every world in the chain. Then there are sentences containing O,
but no LT -sentences, whose truth-value at worlds in the chain is sensitive to what
is true at that further world. More formally:
Theorem 1. O is not definable in LT relative to the class of totality models.
Proof. Define M and M′ as follows, where W = {wi : i ∈ N}, <= {〈wi, wj〉 :
i >N j}, I a function that maps every natural number to the empty set, and I ′ a
function defined by I ′(0) = {ω} and I ′(i) = ∅ for all i 6= 0:
• M = 〈W,<, I〉
• M′ = 〈W ∪ {ω}, < ∪{〈ω, i〉 : i ∈ N}, I ′〉
Clearly Mw0 O¬p0 and 6M
′
w0
O¬p0. However, for every A ∈ LT , Mw0 A iff M
′
w0
A. This is proved by induction on the length of formulas. For atomic pi, the
claim follows immediately from the definition of I and I ′. The induction steps
for the usual propositional connectives are straightforward. For TA, the claim
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follows immediately from Lemma 2 and the fact that w0 belongs to a homogeneous
unending chain in both M and M′. 
Since T can be defined in terms of O, the language LT is expressively weaker
than LO, which is like LT except that it contains O in place of T . Hence we cannot
piggy-back directly on the work done in modal logic.
To define axiomatic systems of total logic, I shall start with three axiom
schemas:
(A0) All tautologies.
(A1) TA→ A
(A2) TA ∧ TB → T (A ∨B)
All LT -instances of (A0), (A1), and (A2) are valid in all totality models. In the case
of (A0), this is a consequence of the fact that the evaluation clauses for the usual
propositional connectives—which I have not explicitly specified—are the standard
ones of classical propositional logic. For (A1), suppose that Mw TA. Then by
Definition 1, Mw A. Hence by the standard clause for →, Mw TA → A. For
(A2), suppose that Mw TA ∧ TB. Then Mw TA, and hence Mw A, and therefore
Mw A∨B. Let w′ be such that w′ < w. Then neither Mw′ A nor Mw′ B, and hence
6Mw′ A ∨B. By Definition 1, it follows that Mw T (A ∨B).
Next, we consider two rules of inference (‘` A’ expresses that A is a thesis):
RMP If ` A→ B and ` A, then ` B.
RIM If ` A→ B, then ` A→ (TB → TA).
‘RMP’ stands for “Rule of Modus Ponens”, and does not require comment. ‘RIM’
stands for “Rule of Inverse Monotonicity”. In modal logic, the Rule of Monotonicity
says that if A → B is a thesis, then so is A → B. The name “Inverse Mono-
tonicity” might suggest the rule that if A → B is a thesis, then so is TB → TA.
That rule has some prima facie plausibility: if B is complete enough a description
for TA to be true, and A is logically stronger than B, then A is also complete
enough a description of the world for TA to be true. On reflection, however, it is
clear that TB → TA is only guaranteed if A is also true. This proviso has been
taken into account in the formulation of RIM above.
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RIM preserves validity in all totality models. ForM = 〈W,<, I〉, suppose that
M A → B. Let w ∈ W be such that Mw A and Mw TB. Then for w′ such that
w′ < w, 6Mw′ B. Together with Mw′ A → B, this entails that 6Mw′ A. Since w′ was
chosen arbitrarily, Mw TA.
Let a system of total logic be any class of LT -sentences that includes all instances
of (A0)–(A2), and that is closed under RMP and RIM. Let C be the smallest
system of total logic.9 We have already shown that every thesis of C is valid in
every totality frame. So C is sound for the class of all totality frames.
We can now derive further rules that are admissible in any system of total logic.
I shall omit the proofs, which are straightforward but occasionally tedious. The
rules can be called, respectively, “Rule of Propositional Logic”, “Rule of Equiva-
lence”, and “Rule of Replacement”:
RPL If ` A1, . . . ,` An and B is a PL-consequence of A1, . . . , An, then ` B.
RE If ` A↔ B then ` T (A)↔ T (B).
RRep If ` B ↔ B′, then ` A[B′, B]↔ A.
In RRep, ‘A[B′, B]’ is any formula that can be obtained from A by replacing B in
one or more places with B′.
Next, I shall list a few schemas all of whose instances are theses of C, and thus
of every system of total logic.
(T1) TA→ TTA
(T2) TA↔ TTA
To prove that (T1) is a thesis in every system of total logic, we note that by (A1),
RIM, and RMP, TA→ (TA→ TTA) is a thesis, from which the result follows by
RPL. The thesishood of (T2) follows immediately from that of (T1) and (A1).
A number of other theses can be derived very quickly using RIM. They are all
variations on the idea that if something is a total truth, then any truth that is
logically stronger is so too:
(T3) TA ∧B → T (A ∧B)
9It is easy to verify that this is a legitimate definition. The intersection of all systems of total
logic is itself a system of total logic, and is a subset of every system of total logic.
13
To derive this, note that by RPL (n = 0), ` A ∧ B → A. By RIM, ` A ∧ B →
(TA→ T (A ∧B)). Also ` TA→ A (Axiom A1). The result follows with RPL.
(T4) T (A ∨B) ∧ A→ TA
For by an instance of (T3), ` T (A ∨ B) ∧ A → T ((A ∨ B) ∧ A). By RPL, `
((A ∨B) ∧ A)↔ A. With RE, (T4) can be derived.
(T5) T (A ∨B) ∧ ¬A→ TB
(T6) T (A ∨B)→ TA ∨ TB
For (T5), note that by (T3), ` T (A ∨ B) ∧ ¬A → T ((A ∨ B) ∧ ¬A). Since
` (A∨B)∧¬A↔ B, the result follows with REP. Thesis (T6) follows, using RPL,
from (T4) and (T5).
Further, we can generalize (A2) to any finite number of conjuncts, and we can
derive that T distributes over conjunction.
(T7) TA1 ∧ . . . ∧ TAn → T (A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An)
(T8) TA1 ∧ . . . ∧ TAn → T (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An)
For (T7), we use n− 1 instances of (A2) and RPL (plus a tacit convention of
dropping brackets). Repeated application of (A1) and (T3) allows us to derive
(T8).
I shall now show that the system C is complete as well as sound for the class
of totality models.
Definition 3. Given a system S of total logic, let MS be 〈W, <, I〉, where
1. WS = {w: w a maximal S-consistent set of sentences of LT}.
2. <S= {〈w′, w〉: for all A ∈ LT , A 6∈ w′ whenever TA ∈ w}.
3. IS(j) = {w : pj ∈ w}.
It is obvious that for any system S, MS is a totality model.
In light of the following result, MS deserves to be called a “canonical model”
for system S.
Lemma 3. For every w ∈ WS and every A, A ∈ w iff MSw A.
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Proof. By induction on the complexity of LT -sentences. For an atomic sentence
pj, pj ∈ w iff w ∈ IS(j) iff MSw pj. The induction steps for the connectives of
propositional logic are straightforward.
Suppose TA ∈ w. By (A1), TA → A ∈ w, and by RPL, A ∈ w. By the
induction hypothesis, MSw A. Let w′ <S w. Then by Definition 3.2, A 6∈ w′. By
the induction hypothesis, 6MSw′ A. Hence MSw TA.
Now suppose TA 6∈ w. Case (i): A 6∈ w. Then by the induction hypothesis,
6MSw A. Definition 1 gives us 6MSw TA. Case (ii): A ∈ w. Consider the set
A ∪ {¬B : TB ∈ w}. If that set is inconsistent, then there are B1, . . . , Bn such
that TB1, . . . , TBn are all in w and ` A ∧ ¬B1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Bn →⊥. By RPL, `
A → B1 ∨ . . . ∨ Bn. By RIM, ` A → (T (B1 ∨ . . . ∨ Bn) → TA). Since A ∈ w,
T (B1∨ . . .∨Bn)→ TA ∈ w. By (T7), ` TB1∧ . . .∧TBn → T (B1∨ . . .∨Bn). Since
TB1, . . . , TBn are all in w, T (B1∨ . . .∨Bn) ∈ w. It follows that TA ∈ w, contrary
to the assumption that w is consistent. Hence the set A ∪ {¬B : TB ∈ w} is
consistent. By Lindenbaum’s Lemma, it is a subset of some maximal S-consistent
set w′. By the induction hypothesis, MSw′ A. By the definition of <S, w′ <S w.
Hence 6MSw TA. 
We are now in a position to prove the completeness of C with respect to the
class of totality models.
Theorem 2. If  A then ` A.
Proof. Suppose 6` A. Then ¬A is consistent in C. By Lindenbaum’s Lemma,
there is a maximally consistent set w such that ¬A ∈ w. By the definition of WC ,
w ∈ WC . With Lemma 3, MCw ¬A. Hence 6 ¬A. 
Since a system is determined by a class of frames just in case it is sound and
complete with respect to it, this establishes the following:
Theorem 3. System C is determined by the class of all totality frames.
5 A system for partial order frames
The system C is simple and elegant. As we have seen, it is sound and complete
with respect to the class of all totality models. But we know from section 2 that in
the intended model, < is a strict partial order, i.e. asymmetric and transitive. So
the question arises whetherC is the strongest LT -system that is sound with respect
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to the Chalmers-Jackson semantics. As it turns out, the answer is negative—C is
not complete with respect to partial order frames. Unfortunately, the system that
is sound and complete also appears to be considerably less simple and elegant than
C.
It includes the following additional axiom schema:
(A3) TA→ T (A↔ (TB → T (A ∨B)))
(A3) does not wear its intuitive meaning on its sleeve. To understand it better, it
is useful to temporarily adopt the primacy interpretation of T . With H interpreted
as “it has always been the case that”, the following is equivalent, given the other
logical principles, to (A3):
(A3H) TA→ H(TB → T (A ∨B))
(A3H) says that if A is true for the first time, then it has always been the case
that B is true for the first time if and only if A ∨ B is true for the first time. On
reflection, this is true—if A is true for the first time, then it has always been false
in the past, and hence A ∨B cannot have become true before B.
Under the totality interpretation, but using the operator O (Definition 2), (A3)
is equivalent to the following:
(A3′) TA→ O(TB → T (A ∨B))
In words: if A is total, then in every outstripped world in which B is total, A ∨B
is also total.
If (A3H) appears obvious to us under the primacy interpretation, this is because
we assume the relation of temporal precedence to be transitive. For we can show
that (A3) corresponds—in the technical sense of that word (van Benthem (2001))—
to the transitivity of <. Say that sentence A defines a class of frames S iff A is
valid on all frames in S and invalid on all frames not in S. Then we can state the
correspondence result as follows:
Theorem 4. Sentence (A3) defines the class of all transitive totality frames.
Proof. We first show that all instances of (A3) are valid in all transitive totality
models. Suppose that M is transitive, and that Mw TA. Then Mw A. By (A2)
and RPL, ` TA→ (TB → T (A ∨ B)). By the soundness result for C, Mw TA→
(TB → T (A∨B)). Hence Mw TB → T (A∨B). Hence Mw A↔ (TB → T (A∨B)).
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It remains to show that whenever w′ < w, then Mw′ ¬(A↔ TB → T (A ∨B)).
Since Mw TA, Mw′ ¬A. So the claim follows if we can show that Mw′ TB →
T (A∨B). Suppose that Mw′ ¬T (A∨B). If Mw′ ¬(A∨B), then Mw′ ¬TB, and thus
Mw′ TB → T (A∨B). If Mw′′ A∨B for some w′′ < w, then by the transitivity of <,
w′′ < w, and Mw′′ ¬A. Hence Mw′′ B, and thus Mw′ ¬B and Mw′ TB → T (A ∨B).
Next, we show that (A3) fails on every frame that is not transitive. Suppose
that F is not transitive. Then there are w,w′, w′′ such that w′′ < w′, w′ < w, but
not w′′ < w. Then w′ is distinct from w and from w′′. Let I(0) be {w,w′′}, and
I(1) be {w′}. Then Mw Tp0. Since Mw′′ p0 ∨ p1, 6Mw′ T (p0 ∨ p1). Since Mw′ Tp1,
6Mw′ Tp1 → T (p0 ∨ p1), and Mw′ p0 ↔ Tp1 → T (p0 ∨ p1). Hence 6Mw T (p0 ↔ Tp1 →
T (p0 ∨ p1)). 
Define C3 to be the smallest system of total logic that contains all LT -instances
of (A3). By Theorem 4, some instances of (A3) fail on non-transitive totality
frames. By the soundness result for C, not all instances of (A3) are theses of the
basic system C, and hence C3 is distinct from C.
As a corollary to Theorem 4, the soundness of C3 with respect to the class
of transitive totality frame follows. I shall now turn to the task of establishing
completeness. Lemma 3 applies to all systems of total logic, and hence to C3.
As implicitly defined by clause 2 of Definition 3, <C3 is the relation that holds
between maximally C3-consistent sets of sentences w′ and w just in case A 6∈ w′
whenever TA ∈ w. Establishing the transitivity of <C3 would be enough to prove
the completeness of C3 with respect to the class of transitive totality frames.
However, <C3 is not transitive. It is a consequence of Definition 3.2 and Lemma
3 that if a world w is inexhaustible inMS—i.e. such that 6MSw TA for all A ∈ LT—
then w outstrips every world in the canonical model: since TA ∈ w is false for all
A, the condition that A 6∈ w′ whenever TA ∈ w is vacuously satisfied by every w′.
It is a further consequence that every exhaustible world v fails to outstrip itself:
for some A, MSv TA and hence both TA ∈ v and A ∈ v. So if inexhaustible w is
outstripped by exhaustible v, we will have v <S w and w <S v but not v <S v, in
violation of transitivity.
To establish that <C3 is not transitive, it remains to show that there is an
inexhaustible w and an exhaustible v such that w <C3 v. In order to define
such worlds—maximal C3-consistent sets of sentences of LT—I will use a (non-
canonical) transitive totality model as an auxiliary device. Specifically, consider
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N = 〈W,< I〉, with W = {wi : i ∈ N}, <= 〈wi, wj〉 : i >N j, and I(0) = {w0}
and I(j) = ∅ for all j ∈ N \ {0}. For w ∈ W , define t(w) := {A :Nw A} (the
“theory of w”). Since N is a transitive totality model, and since C3 is sound
with respect to such models, both t(w0) and t(w1) are maximally C3-consistent
sets of LT -sentences, and thus belong to the canonical modelMC3. From Lemma
2, and the fact that w1 belongs to a homogeneous unending chain, it follows that
TA 6∈ t(w1) for every A ∈ LT . Hence v <C3 t(w1) for every v ∈ WC3, and in
particular, t(w0) <C3 t(w1). Since I(0) = {w0}, Nw0 Tp0, and hence Tp0 ∈ t(w0).
Consider any A such that TA ∈ t(w0). Then Nw0 TA, and because w1 < w0, 6Nw1 A,
and hence A 6∈ t(w1). Since A was arbitrary, it follows that t(w1) <C3 t(w0). But
Tp0 ∈ t(w0) and p0 ∈ t(w0) entail t(w0) 6<C3 t(w0). So <C3 is not transitive.
I shall now construct another canonical model where inexhaustible worlds only
outstrip themselves. As before, they may be outstripped by exhaustible ones.10
For a set of sets of LT -sentences W , let W
T consist of those w ∈ WS such that
TA ∈ w for some A.
Definition 4. Given a system S of total logic, let M′S be 〈WS, <′S, IS〉, where
1. WS = {w: w a maximal S-consistent set of sentences of LT}.
2. <′S= {〈w′, w〉: either w ∈ WS \W TS and w = w′, or for all A ∈ LT , A 6∈ w′
whenever TA ∈ w}.
3. IS(j) = {w : pj ∈ w}.
Again, it is obvious that M′S is a totality model. The following result shows
that it also deserves to be called a “canonical model”.
Lemma 4. For every w ∈ WS and every A, A ∈ w iff M′Sw A.
Proof. This is proved just like Lemma 3, except that we need to cover the inductive
step for TA 6∈ w and w ∈ WS \W TS . If A 6∈ w, then 6M′Sw A by the induction
hypothesis, and hence 6M′Sw TA. So suppose that A ∈ w. By the induction
hypothesis, M′Sw A. But since w ∈ WS \W TS , w < w, and hence 6M′Sw TA. 
Theorem 5. If F A for all transitive totality frames F then `C3 A.
10There is no reason to think that this new canonical model is in this respect like the intended
model. Possible worlds that are not exhaustible by our language may well outstrip exhaustible
ones.
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Proof. Suppose 6`C3 A. Then ¬A is consistent in C3. By Lindenbaum’s Lemma,
there is a maximally C3-consistent set w such that ¬A ∈ w. By the definition of
WC3, w ∈ WC3. By Lemma 4, 6M′C3w ¬A.
It remains to show that M′C3 is a transitive totality model. So suppose that
w′′ <′C3 w
′ and w′ <′C3 w. Case (i): w
′ ∈ WS \ W TS . Then since w′′ <′C3 w′,
w′′ = w′, and thus w′′ <′C3 w. Case (ii): w
′ ∈ W TS . Then by the definition
of <′C3, w ∈ W TS . Let A be any sentence such that TA ∈ w. Then since `C3
(A3), T (A ↔ (TB → T (A ∨ B)) ∈ w, for every B. Since w′ <′C3 w, ¬(A ↔
(TB → T (A ∨ B))) ∈ w′ and ¬A ∈ w′. Given that w′ is closed under RPL,
TB → T (A ∨ B) ∈ w′, for every B. By hypothesis w′ ∈ W TS , such that there
is a sentence C such that TC ∈ w′. Hence T (A ∨ C) ∈ w′. Since w′′ < w′ and
w′ ∈ W TS , ¬(A ∨ B) ∈ w′′. Since w′′ is closed under RPL, ¬A ∈ w′′. Since this
holds for every A such that TA ∈ w, and since w ∈ W TS , w′′ < w. 
Hence, from Theorems 4 and 5:
Theorem 6. System C3 is determined by the class of transitive totality frames.
The frame of the intended model is not only transitive, but also asymmetric—
it is a partial order frame. This prompts the question whether the asymmetry
constraint allows us to deploy an even stronger system of total logic. The answer
is negative: if a sentence of LT is invalid in some transitive totality frame, it is also
invalid in some partial order frame.
I shall prove the completeness of C3 for partial order frames by applying a
version of the technique known as “bulldozing”. For a simple example of how this
works, consider a model with just two worlds, w and v, where w < v and v < w.
The bulldozing technique turns these into infinitely “copies” w0, w1, . . . of w and
v0, v1, . . . of v, where w0 < w1 and w0 < v1 as well as v0 < v1 and v0 < w1 (and
likewise w1 < w2, w1 < v2, v1 < v2, v1 < w2, etc). This way we turn symmetric
models into asymmetric ones.11
Formally, with wi abbreviating 〈w, i〉:
Definition 5. For a totality model M = 〈W,<, P 〉, define M = 〈W,<, I〉 as
follows:
1. W = W × N
11For a general account of bulldozing, see Blackburn et al. (2001, p. 220-222), for example.
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2. vi<wj =df v < w and i >N j
3. I(j) = I(j)× N
For F = 〈W,<〉, let F be 〈W,<〉.
Lemma 5. If F is a transitive totality frame, F is a partial order frame.
Proof. For transitivity, suppose that wi<w
′
j and w
′
j<w
′′
k . Then w < w
′ and w′ <
w′′, and since < is transitive, w < w′′. Also i > j and j > k, and by the transitivity
of >N, i > k. Hence wi<w
′′
k .
For antisymmetry, suppose that wi<w
′
j. Then i >N j. By the asymmetry of
>N, j 6>N i. Hence it is not the case that w′j<wi. 
Lemma 6. For all A ∈ LT , j ∈ N and every totality model M = 〈W,<, I〉, Mw A
iff Mwj A
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A.
For atomic pj, Mw pj iff w ∈ I(j) iff wj ∈ I(i)×N iff wj ∈ I(j) iff Mwj pj. The
induction steps for the usual propositional connectives are routine.
Now suppose that Mw TA. Then Mw A. By the induction hypothesis, Mwi A.
Let w′k<wi. Then w
′ < w. Since Mw TA, 6Mw′ A. By the induction hypothesis,
6M′w′k A. Hence 
M
wj
TA.
For the other direction, suppose 6Mw TA. Case (i): 6Mw A. Then by the
induction hypothesis, 6Mwi A, and hence 6Mwi TA. Case (ii): Mw′ A for some w′ with
w′ < w. B y the induction hypothesis, Mw′j A for every j ∈ N. Pick k such that
k >N i. Then w
′
k<wi. Hence 6Mwi TA. 
Theorem 7. If F A for all partial order frames F then `C3 A.
Proof. Suppose 6`C3 A. Then by Theorem 5, 6Mw A for some transitive totality
modelM = 〈W,<, I〉 and some w ∈ W . By Lemma 6, 6Mwj A. By Lemma 5,M is
a partial order model. Hence 6F A for the partial order frame F = 〈W,<, I〉. 
So we have a second determination result for C3:
Theorem 8. System C3 is determined by the class of partial order frames.
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6 Further principles and frame conditions
On the Chalmers-Jackson account, outstripping is a strict partial order—as we have
seen, only relatively uncontroversial assumptions about parthood and duplication
are needed to establish this. In the last section, the system C3 was shown to be
sound and complete for strict partial order frames. This falls short of establishing
C3 as the correct total logic, though, even given the Chalmers-Jackson account
of outstripping. For all that has been said, that account may implicitly impose
further conditions on outstripping, which validate principles that are not theses of
C3.
In the temporal case, which is many respects analogous, the assumption of
linearity is quite plausible: any two instants stand in the relation of precedence,
in some order. But the metaphysical assumption that outstripping is linear has
no plausibility whatsoever. A world consisting of a hydrogen atom outstrips both
a world consisting of a lone proton and a world consisting of a lone electron, but
neither of the latter two outstrips the other.
Some other additional frame conditions may be less implausible, though. In-
stead of starting with the frame conditions, I shall formulate prima facie plausible
principles, and then ask what frame conditions they correspond to.
The first principle to be considered, (A4), says that ¬⊥ (sometimes written >)
is not total.
(A4) ¬T¬⊥
The idea is clear: a tautology cannot possibly be a comprehensive truth.
Another prima facie plausible principle concerns iteration. We have seen that
the principle TA → TTA (T1), reminiscent of S4, is a thesis already of the base
logic C. The principle ¬TA → T¬TA, reminiscent of S5, is highly implausible—
¬TA does not tell us much, not even whether A is true or not. But for that very
reason, ¬TA → ¬T¬TA appears promising: ¬TA contains so little information
that it can hardly be total. Since `C TA → ¬T¬TA (from (A1) and contraposi-
tion), adding the schema ¬TA→ ¬T¬TA to a system of total logic has the same
effect as adding the simpler (A5):
(A5) ¬T¬TA
This principle says that no negative totality statement can be total.
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As it turns out, (A4) is a thesis of the systemC5 (defined as the smallest system
of total logic that includes all LT -instances of (A5)). For by (A1), `C5 TA →
¬T¬A. By (A0), `C5 ¬TA → ¬ ⊥, and by RIM, `C5 ¬TA → (T¬ ⊥→ T¬TA).
By RPL, `C5 ¬TA → (¬T¬¬TA → ¬T¬ ⊥). The result follows from (A5) and
RPL.
If we identify a system, as is customary, with the set of its theses, then C4 ⊆
C5, and C45 = C5. It also follows that C34 ⊆ C35 = C345. (For easy
reference, the results about inclusion among systems proved in this section are
diagrammatically represented in Figure 1, below. An extension of a system is
reached upwards along the lines.)
Every instance of (A5) is a thesis of C34. Using (T1), (A2), and RRep, `C
TA ∧ T (¬TA ∨ A) → T¬ ⊥. By (A4), `C4 ¬(TA ∧ T (¬TA ∨ A)). With RPL,
it follows that `C4 (TA → T (¬TA ∨ A)) ↔ ¬TA. By an instance of (A3),
`C34 T¬TA → T (¬TA ↔ (TA → T (¬TA ∨ A). By RRep, `C34 T¬TA →
T (¬TA ↔ ¬TA). Since `C (¬TA ↔ ¬TA) ↔ ¬ ⊥, `C34 T¬TA → T (¬ ⊥).
Applying (A4) and RPL, `C34 ¬T¬TA.
Together with the earlier result, this entails C34 = C35 = C345.
To establish the distinctness of certain systems, we will use model-theoretical
tools. Say that a frame F = 〈W,<〉 is serial if for all w ∈ W , there is w′ such that
w′ < w. In a serial frame, no world is minimal.
Theorem 9. Sentence (A4) is defined by the class of serial frames.
Proof. To show that (A4) is valid in every serial frame F , pick any w ∈ W . By
seriality, there is w′ with w′ < w. Then Fw ¬ ⊥, and hence Fw ¬T¬ ⊥. Now
suppose that F is not serial. Then there is w ∈ W such that w′ 6< w for all
w′ ∈ W . Hence Fw T¬ ⊥. 
Let F be an irreflexive frame consisting of one world. Since F is transitive,
every thesis of C3 is valid in it. But since it is not serial, (A4) is not. Hence
C4 6⊆ C3. Since some serial frames—on which every thesis of C4 is valid—are
not transitive, the converse result, C3 6⊆ C4, also follows.
Determination results are now straightforward.
Theorem 10. System C4 is determined by the class of all serial frames.
Proof. It is enough to show that the canonical modelMC4 (Definition 3) is serial.
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For every w ∈ WC4, ¬T (¬⊥) ∈ w. By Lemma 3, MC4w ¬T (¬⊥). Since MC4w ¬⊥,
there is w′ ∈ WC4 such that w′ < w. 
Theorem 11. System C34(= C35) is determined by the class of all serial partial
order frames.
Proof. We first show that the canonical modelM′C34 (Definition 4), already shown
to be transitive, is serial. For every w in the model, ¬T (¬ ⊥) ∈ w. By Lemma 4,
M∗C34 ¬T (¬ ⊥). Since M∗C34 ¬ ⊥, there is a world w′ such that w′ < w.
Next, we assume that A fails in a transitive and serial model M = 〈W,<, I〉.
In the light of Lemma 6, it is enough to verify that the operation of bulldozing of
Definition 5 preserves seriality. Pick w ∈ W . Then w = 〈v, n〉, with v ∈ W and
n ∈ N. By the seriality of <, there exists v′ ∈ W such that v′ < v. Define w′ as
〈v′, n + 1〉. Then w′<w. So < is serial. 
While (A4) corresponds to seriality, (A5) corresponds to a a closely related
condition. Let a world w be doubly outstripping in F if there are w′, w′′ such that
w′′ < w′, w′ < w, and w′′ < w. Further, say that A is valid in a world w in frame
F if Mw A for every model M on frame F .
Lemma 7. Sentence (A5) is valid in world w in frame F iff w is doubly outstrip-
ping in F .
Proof. First, I show that (A5) is valid in every world w that is doubly outstripping
in F . There are w′, w′′ with w′ < w, w′′ < w, and w′′ < w′. If 6Mw′ A, then Mw′ ¬TA,
and thus Mw ¬T (¬TA). If 6Mw′′ A, we reason in the same way. So assume Mw′ A
and 6Mw′′ A. Since w′′ < w′, Mw′ ¬TA, and since w′ < w, Mw ¬T (¬TA).
Now suppose that w is not doubly outstripping in F . Then there is w ∈ W
such that for all w′, w′′ ∈ W , if w′ < w and w′′ < w, then neither w′′ < w′ nor
w′ < w′′. Note that in particular, w 6< w. Define I(0) = {v : v < w}. Then
Mw ¬p0, and thus Mw ¬Tp0. Consider any w′ with w′ < w. By the definition of I,
Mw′ p0. Now consider any w′′ such that w′′ < w′. Then w′′ 6< w, and thus 6Mw′′ p0.
Hence Mw′ Tp0, and thus 6Mw T¬Tp0. 
Say that a frame F is bi-serial if every w ∈ W is doubly outstripping. The
following is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 7:
Theorem 12. Sentence (A5) is defined by the class of bi-serial frames.
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Clearly, every bi-serial frame is serial. The converse also holds in the class of
transitive frames. For suppose that < is transitive and serial, and let w ∈ W . By
seriality, there is w′ ∈ W such that w′ < w. By seriality again, there is w′′ ∈ W
such that w′′ < w′. By transitivity, w′′ < w. So < is serial.
Since not every serial frame is bi-serial, Theorem 12 and Theorem 9 together
entail that (A5) is not a thesis of C4, and hence that C5 6= C4. It is likewise easy
to verify that C3 6⊆ C5. Clearly, C3 ⊆ C34, so C34 is distinct from C5.
The intended frame, which is transitive, will be bi-serial provided that it is
serial. But is it serial? It would appear that it is not, i.e. that there are possible
worlds that do not outstrip any other possible world. One relevant example is a
point-sized possible world: since it has no proper spatial parts, no possible world
duplicates any of its proper spatial parts.
A defender of seriality has three responses. First, she may hold that spacetime
has, necessarily, only regions as parts, and no points.12 Second, she may hold
that while extended worlds have point-sized parts, no possible world is itself point-
sized. A third defence of seriality turns on the observation that the Chalmers-
Jackson account is only adequate if things have non-spatiotemporal parts. These
non-spatiotemporal parts may be properties—as I shall assume here—or bearers
of properties. So, for example, a point particle may have a certain determinate
of mass as a proper part. According to a theory of quantities due to David M.
Armstrong, mass determinates have smaller mass determinates as proper parts.13
But presumably, there is no zero-mass part. Given that there is no smallest non-
zero mass, every mass part of a point particle would seem to have a proper part
that duplicates another one-particle world. If the case of mass is representative for
all property parts, then every typical possible world outstrips some other possible
world. This is, admittedly, a big “if”—but my present aim is only to discuss the
consequences of certain metaphysical views for the logic of totality, not to evaluate
those metaphysical views.14
But even if every typical possible world outstrips some other worlds, the in-
tended frame may still fail to be serial—namely, if there are also untypical worlds
that do not outstrip any world. Prime candidates here are so-called “empty
12For discussion, see Arntzenius (2008).
13This is somewhat simplified, but not in a way that would affect the present discussion.
14For reasons against generalizing from the case of mass, see the critical discussion of Arm-
strong’s account in Eddon (2007).
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worlds”. There has been a large debate about whether there are such things.15
Offhand, it seems that there ought to be, since it is not necessary that there
is something rather than nothing. However, some theorists of possible worlds—
notably David Lewis—had trouble making room for such things in their theories.
If possible worlds are concrete things, how can there be an empty one?
An empty world leads to further theoretical difficulties in the context of the
Chalmers-Jackson account of outstripping. To recall, the account reads:
CJ-Outstripping w outstrips w′ iff some proper part of w duplicates w′, but no
proper part of w′ duplicates w.
This clearly has the result that if there is an empty world—which has no proper
parts—then that world does not outstrip any other one, in violation of seriality.
So far, so good. But it also seems to lead to the result that an empty world is not
outstripped by any world, not even non-empty ones. What part of a non-empty
world is duplicated by an empty one? At best a so-called “null individual”. But
standard mereology does not countenance null individuals. So it seems that on
the Chalmers-Jackson account, empty worlds are neither in the domain nor the
co-domain of the relation of outstripping.16
The problem may require a small modification of the Chalmers-Jackson account
of outstripping.
CJ-Outstripping* w outstrips w′ iff w is non-empty and w′ empty, or some
proper part of w duplicates w′, but no proper part of w′ duplicates w.
This disjunctive account admittedly looks somewhat ad hoc. It would take us too
deep into mereology to discuss alternative solutions.
A metaphysican who accepts empty possible worlds and CJ-Outstripping* has
to reject (A4) and (A5) as invalid. But suppose that she thinks that seriality holds
among the non-empty worlds—that every non-empty outstrips another non-empty
world. She can then still accept a system that properly extends C3, as I will now
show.
Given CJ-Outstripping*, and supposing that there is one and only one empty
world, mereologically atomic worlds will outstrip exactly one world. Let a frame
15Coggins (2010) is a book-length treatment, with references.
16Thanks to Alex Skiles for raising this issue.
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〈W,<〉 be non-atomic if every w ∈ W is either doubly outstripping or else is
minimal (i.e. such that w′ 6< w for every w′ ∈ W ). Consider now an axiom schema
that is equivalent to the material conditional with (A4) as the antecedent and (A5)
as the consequent:
(A6) T¬TA→ T¬⊥
Clearly, C6 ⊆ C5—every thesis of the system C6 is also a thesis of C5.
Theorem 13. Sentence (A6) defines the class of non-atomic frames.
Proof. If w is minimal in F , then for every model M on F , Mw T¬ ⊥, and
hence Mw T¬TA → T¬ ⊥. If w is doubly outstripping, then by Lemma 7, in
F , then for every model M on F , and every A ∈ LT , Mw ¬T¬TA, and hence
Mw T¬TA→ T¬⊥. So (A6) is valid in that class. Suppose now that F = 〈W,<〉
is not a non-atomic frame. Then there is w ∈ W that is neither doubly outstripping
nor minimal. By 7, there is a model M on F such that Mw T¬Tp0. But since w
is not minimal in F , Mw ¬T¬⊥. Hence an instance of (A6) fails at w in M. 
Since (A6) is not valid on transitive frames, it is not a thesis of C3. It follows
that C6 6⊆ C3 and C36 6⊆ C3. Conversely, we have C36 6⊆ C6, due to the
existence of non-atomic frames that fail to be transitive. Moreover, some non-
atomic frames are not serial, and vice versa, such that C6 6⊆ C4 and C4 6⊆ C6.
With C6 and C36, all the systems to be discussed in this paper have been
introduced. Their relationships are summarized in following Figure 1. To recall,
the candidates for the right system of total logic seem to be C3 and its extensions
C36 and C34.
I shall conclude the paper by proving the expected determination results for
C36:
Theorem 14. System C36 is determined by the class of transitive and non-atomic
frames.
Proof. Soundness has in effect already been established. In light of the proof of
Theorem 5, verifying that M′ (Definition 4) is non-atomic is sufficient for estab-
lishing the completeness part. Suppose that w ∈ WC36 is not minimal. Then
M′w ¬T¬⊥. By Lemma 4, ¬T¬⊥∈ w. Since T¬T¬⊥→ T¬⊥ is an instance of
(A6), it is a member of w. Hence ¬T¬T¬⊥∈ w. By Lemma 4, M′w ¬T¬T¬⊥, and
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Figure 1: Systems extending C
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there is thus w′ ∈ WC36 with w′ <′ w and M′w′ ¬T¬⊥. Then w′ is not minimal,
and we can repeat the argument to show that there is w′′ ∈ WC36 with w′′ <′ w′.
Since <′ is transitive, w′′ < w. It follows that w is doubly outstripping and M′,
and hence that the frame of M′ is non-atomic as well as transitive. 
Since bulldozing (Definition 5) maps minimal worlds to minimal worlds and
doubly outstripping worlds to doubly outstripping worlds, the following also holds:
Theorem 15. System C36 is determined by the class of non-atomic partial order
frames.
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